Symposium Introduction: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Global Perspective by Modak-Truran, Mark C.
Mississippi College School of Law
MC Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles Faculty Publications
2003
Symposium Introduction: Law, Religion, and
Human Rights in Global Perspective
Mark C. Modak-Truran
Mississippi College School of Law, mmodak@mc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.mc.edu/faculty-journals
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of MC Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact walter@mc.edu.
Recommended Citation
22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 165 (2003).
SYMPOSIUM
LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Mark C. Modak- Truran *
"Our age is not an age of secularization," according to the prominent sociol-
ogist Peter Berger, but "it is an age of exuberant religiosity."1 Religion has not
faded away with the emerging global culture but has remained a vital and potent
force around the globe. Berger's empirical studies have verified that "[m]ost of
the world today is as religious as it ever was, and in some places is more reli-
gious than ever."2 If this is so, why have the conventional understandings of the
nature of law and human rights looked at religion as a problem for the law rather
than a source of insight about or legitimation of the law? Berger points out two
exceptions to the exuberant religiosity of our age that may explain this current
state of affairs. He claims that a "cross-national cultural elite" including
Western academics (sociological exception) and the region of western and cen-
tral Europe (geographical exception) are both exceptions to these general trends.'
In other words, Western academics, who are the group most responsible for con-
structing contemporary conceptions of law and human rights, tend to ignore or
reject the importance of religion in their own lives. Given this fact, it should not
be surprising that Western academics have likewise frequently ignored or reject-
ed the academic importance of religion.
To correct for this academic blindness, the essays and articles in this
Symposium highlight the importance of religion for properly understanding the
nature of law, feminism, globalization, human rights, international legal history,
and judicial decision making. These essays and articles also challenge the acad-
emy to accept a more sophisticated understanding of religion and to understand
its importance for all academic inquiry. In this respect, the renowned theologian
David Tracy has pointed out that "religions are exercises in resistance. Whether
seen as Utopian visions or believed in as revelations of Ultimate Reality, the reli-
gions reveal various possibilities for human freedom that are not intended for
that curious distancing act that has become second nature to our aesthetic [acade-
mic] sensibilities."4 He further claims that religious questions are "limit ques-
tions" which "must be logically odd questions, since they are questions about the
most fundamental presuppositions, the most basic beliefs, of all our knowing,
willing, and acting."5 Tracy's notion of religion as a form of resistence provides
a paradigm for understanding the six essays and articles in this Symposium.
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1. Peter L. Berger, Globalization and Religion, 4 The Hedgehog Rev. 7, 10 (2002) (emphasis in original)
(issue devoted to Religion and Globalization).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 84 (1987).
5. Id. at 87.
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Like religion itself, each contribution is a form of religious resistence against the
status quo images and understandings of law and human rights. In addition, his
notion of religion as dealing with "limit questions" further explains why these
articles and essays complicate rather than simplify our understanding of the rela-
tionship between law, religion, and human rights. Seeking a deeper understand-
ing of the law and human rights means that the story becomes more complex
rather than more simple.
Although all the essays and articles recognize the importance of religion, they
do so in different ways that can be classified into two distinctive groups. The
first group of essays and articles by Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Cheryl B.
Preston, and Emily Albrink Hartigan challenges the status quo but does so by
emphasizing the particularity of religion and the contextual nature of law.
Universal understandings of law, religion, and globalization are challenged in
order to make room for more nuanced understandings of these phenomenon or
epiphenomenon. They all deconstruct or decenter our current understandings of
law, religion, feminism, and globalization. By contrast, the second group of
essays and articles by Mark Weston Janis, Franklin I. Gamwell, and myself chal-
lenges the status quo by attempting to revise the current universal claims about
law, human rights, and judicial decision making so that religion is properly taken
into account. They advocate a new universal understanding of international law,
human rights, and judicial decision making that recognizes the centrality of reli-
gion.
One of the unexpected and interesting facts about these two groups of essays
and articles is that they breakdown along gender lines. The first group are all
written by women, and the second group are all written by men. Although there
was an expectation that each author would contribute something unique to the
Symposium, no one planned this breakdown along gender lines. This break-
down mirrors the common assertion that women are more often drawn to partic-
ularity and narrative while men are drawn to universality and abstraction.' I do
not point this out, however, as further evidence of this hypothesis but to note that
it raises the question as to whether our concepts and conceptions of religion, law,
and human rights are gender specific as well as Western. I leave for the reader
the resolution of this difficult question, and in the following, I briefly summarize
each essay and article to provide an overview of their provocative challenges to
the status quo.
I. THE PARTICULARITY OF RELIGION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan's essay entitled Religious Freedom and the Rule
of Law: Exporting Modernity in a Postmodern World?' provides a good intro-
duction to the complexity of the issues involved in understanding the phenome-
6. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 333, 344
(Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (arguing that "[m]any feminist legal critics are also
drawn to narrative styles that express the personal consequences of institutionalized injustice" and "usually sit-
uate their works in the lived experience of pornography or sexual harassment rather than, for example in the
deep structure of Blackstone's Commentaries or the fundamental contradictions in Western political thought").
7. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religious Freedom and the Rule of Law: Exporting Modernity in a
Postmodern World?, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 173 (2003).
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non or epiphenomenon of religion and its relationship to law. To uncover this
complexity, she relies on scholars from a multiplicity of disciplines including
anthropology, history of religions, political theory, law, religious history, and
sociology. From the beginning, she notes that there is little academic agreement
about the definition of religion and tries to get a purchase on the concept "from
the perspective of law."8 She argues that "'religion' cannot be understood apart
from an understanding of the cluster of ideas around the invention and regulation
of modem religion, including religious freedom, disestablishment, and the sepa-
ration of church and state, ideas that are largely indebted, on the religious side, to
liberal protestant theological reflection and culture."9 The concept of religion
emerging from early modem Europe and the Protestant Reformation is a modem
protestant understanding of religion as "private, voluntary, individual, and
believed."1 This analysis leads to a problematic tension: "in Western democra-
cies religious freedom and the rule of law are modernist constructs," while
"'post-modern' religion" is often illiberal and refuses "to occupy the legal space
set apart from it by protestant theology and modem law."' 1 Given the historical
shift from modernity to post-modernity, Sullivan cautions against relying on out-
dated modernist notions of religion and law to support advancing religious free-
dom. Rather, she calls for "a reexamination of rationales for laws privileging
religion and the bargain made by the Protestant churches, a bargain that Sidney
Mead called 'the Trojan horse in the comfortable citadel of [American] denomi-
nationalism..".
Cheryl Preston's article, Women in Traditional Religions: Refusing to Let
Patriarchy (or Feminism) Separate Us from the Source of Our Liberation,13 fur-
ther challenges contemporary feminists to reevaluate their often reductionistic
dismissal of traditional religions as a source of liberation for women. As a com-
mitted member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Preston rejects
"the usual secular, liberal epistemologies that deny faith within an organized
structure" that are usually employed by feminists in their critique of organized
religions as patriarchal. 4 For example, she points to the controversy over the
burqa worn by traditional Muslim women as the "feminist ensign of our age."' 5
She notes that feminists tend to "reduce Third World women to the category of
victim" and fail to see how their imperialistic views help "camouflage the vio-
lence and brutality of colonialism.' 1 6 In response, Preston does not suggest gen-
der issues or the abuse of power in the name of religion should be ignored.
However, she thinks that gender issues can be addressed within traditional reli-
gions so that faith in a traditional religion can be reconciled with feminism and
feminism can be reconciled with organized religious faith. This prevents an
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 177, 175-76.
12. Id. at 183.
13. Cheryl B. Preston, Women in Traditional Religions: Refusing to Let Patriarchy (or Feminism) Separate
Us from the Source of Our Liberation, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 185 (2003).
14. Id. at 186.
15. Id. at 185.
16. Id. at 195, 194.
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either/or choice requiring women to choose between their traditional religion
(which women tend to support more than men) and their liberation from patri-
archy. Faced with such a choice, Preston argues that many women will choose
their religious commitments over their commitment to feminism. Alternatively,
she advocates that balancing these commitments requires women within tradi-
tional religions to make their own assessment of their oppression and liberation.
With this approach, "religion and feminism work together in a woman's life to
help her reach her full potential."17
Similarly, Emily Albrink Hartigan's article, Globalization in a Fallen World.-
Redeeming Dust,18 resists the conventional understandings of globalization and
the methods used to explore this phenomenon. She challenges "the discursive,
,rational' discourse of the late twentieth century university and political-cultural
commentary in the United States of America and Great Britain," which she iden-
tifies as the "primary paradigm used in academic globalization discussion."1 By
contrast, her article's "most authentic manner of expression and process is not
linear and purportedly syllogistic, but narrative and parabolic."2 By relying on
the spiritual aspects of Jacques Derrida, Ivone Gebara, William Stringfellow,
David Tracy, and feminist spirituality, this method attempts to decenter our cur-
rent legal consciousness to allow the religion-beyond-religion and the God-
beyond-God to participate in shaping an emergent legal consciousness and
understanding of globalization. In other words, although I would not pretend to
capture or compress the movement of her essay, her essay focuses on the prophe-
cy and hope that can be realized from an embodied knowledge of the Spirit's
redemptive presence-and-absence. For example, she points to the possibilities of
redemption that could arise from a "new merchant law." Merchant law results
from gathering the customs under which merchants trade goods and has been
compared to the way in which merchants' boots use to gather dust in their travels
on the unpaved roads of Europe and England. Hartigan notes that in certain trad-
ing arrangements between France and the United States, "we find that trading
partners such as France who have values with substantive content can in effect
change our Constitution. One form of globalization-regulation, then, may be the
conscientious actions of other nation-states."21 Hartigan ends her essay stating:
"I persist in my hope that from the strongest particularity we can muster, weav-
ing in and out of the texts we share and adding threads of new and strange texts
and stories, we will end up with something unexpected, unthematic, and beauti-
ful.'122
17. Id. at 214.
18. Emily Albrink Hartigan, Globalization in a Fallen World. Redeeming Dust, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 215
(2003).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 228-29.
22. Id. at 232.
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II. THE UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW
In contrast to the critiques of universality by Sullivan, Preston, and Hartigan,
the last three articles by Janis, Gamwell, and myself argue for a new universal
understanding of international law, human rights, and judicial decision making
that recognizes the centrality of religion. Rather than calling into question the
merits of universal international legal norms, Mark Weston Janis's essay entitled
A Sampler of Religious Experiences in International Law23 begins to rewrite the
history of international law to take into account the important contributions of
religion to international law. He argues that "[r]eligious principles, religious
problems, and religious enthusiasts have all played profound, if sometimes little
appreciated roles in the development of international law."24 Janis first identifies
and defuses "three suspicions international lawyers have of religion"25 that have
contributed to this failure to appreciate the role of religion. The first suspicion
arises from the failed attempt by those like Oppenheim to turn law into a science
under the influence of legal positivism. A second suspicion of religion derives
from the "fear of excluding or alienating those whose values and religious beliefs
are quite different from" those of the Western perspective." The third and last
suspicion stems from the concern that religion has historically lead to division
and warfare as evidenced by the thirty years war in Germany and that intema-
tional law has a limited capacity to bridge these religious differences with
treaties like the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.27 After overcoming these suspi-
cions, Janis outlines two important contributions of religion to international law.
The first contribution derives from "the sometimes beneficial influence of reli-
gious enthusiasms on the development of international law" including great fig-
ures such as Francisco Suarez, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, David Low
Dodge, Noah Worcester, William Ladd, Elihu Burritt, and Woodrow Wilson.28
In addition, religion made an important contribution to international law by pro-
viding "universalistic norms ... protect[ing] religious diversity."29 In closing,
Janis even notes some parallels between religion and international law including
"the aspiration of both to teach and affirm a universalistic message" and an
"evangelistic core."3
Franklin Gamwell's article entitled The Purpose of Human Rights31 argues
for an even deeper relationship between religion and human rights by challeng-
ing the modern consensus among political philosophers such as Jrgen
Habermas, Alan Gewirth, Brian Barry, and John Rawls "that a principle or prin-
ciples of human rights must be independent of any comprehensive telos to which
all human activity ought to be directed. '32 The novelty of Gamwell's challenge
to the modem consensus is not his agreement with the pre-modem claim that all
23. Mark Weston Janis, A Sampler of Religious Experiences in International Law, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 233
(2003).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 234.
27. Id. at 234-35.
28. Id. at 235-36.
29. Id. at 236.
30. Id. at 238.
31. Franklin I. Gamwell, The Purpose of Human Rights, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 239 (2003)
11 Id
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human life (including politics) is properly directed to an all-inclusive divine pur-
pose or comprehensive telos but his rejection of authority as the grounding for
comprehensive teleology. Gamwell considers modernity's "commitment to the
autonomy of reason". "non-negotiable" so that claims about God, morality, and
politics must be rationally redeemed.3 The mistake of modem thought has been
to dismiss comprehensive teleology by merely assuming that it cannot be ratio-
nally redeemed. Thus, Gamwell's position that human rights depend on a ratio-
nal comprehensive teleology constitutes a unique alternative to the medieval
affirmation of a comprehensive teleology based on authority and the modem
affirmation of a nonteleological account of human rights based on reason.
To support his teleological conception of human rights, Gamwell argues "that
the meta-ethical character of every claim to moral validity includes [the principle
of communicative respect] by which a universal community of rights is consti-
tuted."'  The principle of communicative respect provides that individuals are
"morally bound to treat each other as potential participants in moral discourse,"
and thus it "prescribes a democratic political association."35 Gamwell maintains
that a democratic political association requires that the rights in the constitution
be formative (neutral to disagreement about the substantive content of rights)
rather than substantive so that moral and political decisions are subject to contes-
tation and dissent. These rights institute a full and free debate concerning the
question of which conception of the good human association should inform the
substantive rights prescribed by law. In order to secure this debate, the constitu-
tion should include formative rights protecting the prerequisites for discourse
(private liberties such as the rights to life, liberty and property) and "the right of
all individuals or citizens to be participants in the democratic discourse" (public
liberties such as due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, and religious
freedom). 6 Despite the formative nature of the constitution, Gamwell contends
that the formative principle of communicative respect implies a comprehensive
purpose. This comprehensive purpose justifies the principle of communicative
respect and provides the basis for the substantive principles of justice that are
required to resolve moral and political decisions. Gamwell concludes that "[t]he
comprehensive purpose exiled from modem moral and political thought is
reasserted as the purpose of human rights. They are secured morally and politi-
cally by the telos of our maximal common humanity and, through it, the maxi-
mal divine good."3
Finally, my article entitled Reenchanting International Law challenges the
conventional account of international law as relating to "a movement beyond
'the inadequacies of religion' (i.e., religion produces war not peace) to a rational
notion of law to govern the relations among the evolving nation-states."38 For
example, I demonstrate that John Rawls's attempt to support a determinant set of
33. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE: JUSTICE AND THE REALITY OF GOD 4 (2000).
34. Gamwell, supra note 31, at 246.
35. Id. at 248, 252.
36. Id. at 252.
37. Id. at 261.
38. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting International Law, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 263, 264 (2003).
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international legal norms independent of comprehensive doctrines (a "political,
not metaphysical" Law of Peoples) is incoherent because it depends on a compre-
hensive doctrine. To the contrary, I argue that international law needs religion
because it is indeterminate. By focusing on hypothetical judicial decision mak-
ing in hard cases where the law is indeterminate, I show that the interpretation
and application of international law requires judges to rely on comprehensive or
religious convictions about authentic human existence for fully justifying the
extra-legal norms they rely on to decide hard cases. On the other hand, I contend
that a proper understanding of religious pluralism requires that the text of interna-
tional law should remain indeterminate. International law should not adopt the
full justification of legal norms based on comprehensive convictions, but it
should only include noncomprehensive legal and extra-legal norms. This leaves
the official text of international law (judicial opinions, treaties, etc.) indetermi-
nate so that a plurality of comprehensive or religious convictions may justify
international law. "Religious convictions are thus the silent prologue to any full
justification of hard cases. The demands of full justification in hard cases rein-
troduces religious convictions into the justification of international law and there-
by reenchants international law."39
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the essays and articles in this Symposium challenge the con-
ventional understandings of the nature of law, religion, feminism, globalization,
human rights, international legal history, and judicial decision making. These
challenges all center or derive from the attempt to provide a more sophisticated
account of the importance religion for understanding law and human rights and to
take religion seriously as a powerful normative force around the globe. These
essays and articles also aid in transforming our understandings of law and human
rights to take into account Berger's claim that "modernity fosters pluralism"
rather than secularization.4" Berger emphasizes that "[t]his does not mean (as
secularization theory maintained) that people give up beliefs or values, but rather
that these are now chosen rather than taken for granted. Put differently, plural-
ism does not necessarily change what people believe, but how they believe."41
This Symposium helps make a first step in eliminating the long-standing and
deeply-ingrained myth of secularism that informs conventional conceptions of
law and human rights. Demythologizing our conventional secular conceptions of
law and human rights to recognize the importance of religion and its pluralistic
forms will thus be a long process that has only just begun.
39. Id. at 267.
40. Berger, supra note 1, at 11.
41. Id.
